The Lessons of Modern War Volume IV: The Gulf War by Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner

Author:Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner [Cordesman, Anthony H. & Wagner, Abraham R.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Freedom, Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9780813386027
Google: 9m8ftAEACAAJ
Goodreads: 2039131
Publisher: Westview Press
Published: 1996-03-01T00:00:00+00:00

Combined Operations

The Israelis used combined operations throughout the war. This primarily involved the Israeli Army and Air Force, although the Israeli Navy played an important role within the limits imposed by its size and capability. The Israelis made the interface between their army and air elements a centerpiece of their combat doctrine after 1967 and achieved considerable success.

They still, however, experienced some notable problems. The most serious of these problems was timing. The IDF set an extremely demanding, if not impossible, schedule for its offensive. At the same time, the Israeli defense minister expanded the scale of the operation on an ad hoc basis, particularly in regard to movements against Syria and Beirut. This compounded the combined operations problems discussed earlier, and meant that the air-land battle could not be conducted with anything approaching the careful planning used in air-defense suppression and air-to-air combat.

Those problems also led to a number of instances where air power had to be called in without proper mission briefing. It also led to a number of instances when close air support or interdiction bombing should have been used but was not. The IDF’s limited amphibious operations were successful, but IDF ground forces failed to advance at the required rate, and much of their effect was lost.

The Israeli C3 system could not handle the resulting confusion during key stages of the advance, and requests for air support came in too late or were misrouted. It is impossible to say, however, whether this was the result of the political turmoil at the high command level or the result of inherent problems in the IDF’s combined arms organization.

The Israeli Air Force and Army experienced serious problems in executing combined operations in urban and built-up areas where there were large numbers of civilians. Throughout the war, Israeli pilots were called upon to attack small bands of PLO or Syrian troops who were fighting in close proximity to Israeli troops or Lebanese civilians. Accurate targeting and delivery were often impossible, and on at least one occasion, Israeli aircraft bombed an Israeli unit.105 On other occasions, Israeli pilots either hit civilian targets or refused to drop their bombs because they had no way to distinguish the ground targets.106

Nevertheless, these problems should not be exaggerated. Once complete air superiority had been established, the Israelis were then in a position where their army could call for air strikes as they became bogged down on the ground. At Ain Dara, for example, air strikes and anti-armor helicopters were called on 10 June 1982 to help break up effective resistance by Syrian commandos. The IAF’s ability to support the army when it became bogged down, or needed a hostile position “softened up,” was important throughout the war. It was especially important in areas where Israeli ground forces met heavy, unexpected resistance; the el-Bas refugee camp near Tyre was one such area. Israeli troops attempted to penetrate the el-Bas camp on foot but failed to do so. At this point, air power was called upon to attack PLO positions within the camp.

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